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1. Abstract 
Scheduling models deal with the best way of carrying out a set of jobs on given processing 
resources. Typically, the jobs belong to a single decision maker, who wants to find the most 
profitable way of organizing and exploiting available resources, and a single objective 
function is specified. If different objectives are present, there can be multiple objective 
functions, but still the models refer to a centralized framework, in which a single decision 
maker, given data on the jobs and the system, computes the best schedule for the whole 
system. 
This approach does not apply to those situations in which the allocation process involves 
different subjects (agents), each having his/her own set of jobs, and there is no central 
authority who can solve possible conflicts in resource usage over time. In this case, the role 
of the model must be partially redefined, since rather than computing "optimal" solutions, 
the model is asked to provide useful elements for the negotiation process, which eventually 
leads to a stable and acceptable resource allocation. 
Multi-agent scheduling models are dealt with by several distinct disciplines (besides 
optimization, we mention game theory, artificial intelligence etc), possibly indicated by 
different terms. We are not going to review the whole scope in detail, but rather we will 
concentrate on combinatorial models, and how they can be employed for the purpose on 
hand. We will consider two major mechanisms for generating schedules, auctions and 
bargaining models, corresponding to different information exchange scenarios. 
Keywords: Scheduling, negotiation, combinatorial optimization, complexity, bargaining, 
games. 
2. Introduction 
In the classical approach to scheduling problems, all jobs conceptually belong to a single 
decision maker, who is obviously interested in arranging them in the most profitable (or less 
costly) way. This typically consists in optimizing a certain objective function. If more than 
one optimization criterion is present, the problem may become multi-criteria (see e.g. the 
thorough book by T'Kindt and Billaut [33]), but still decision problems and the 
corresponding solution algorithms are conceived in a centralized perspective. O
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This approach does not apply to situations in which, on the contrary, the allocation process 
involves different subjects (agents), each with its own set of jobs, requiring common 
resources, and there is no "superior" subject or authority who is in charge of solving conflicts 
on resource usage. In such cases, mathematical models can play the role of a negotiation 
support tool, conceived to help the agents to reach a mutually acceptable resource 
allocation. Optimization models are still important, but they must in general be integrated 
with other modeling tools, possibly derived from disciplines such as multi-agent systems, 
artificial intelligence or game theory. 
In this chapter we want to present a number of modeling tools for multi-agent scheduling 
problems. Here we always consider situations in which the utility (or cost) function of the 
agents explicitly depends on some scheduling performance indices. Also, we do not 
consider situations in which the agents receiving an unfavorable allocation can be 
compensated through money. Scheduling problems with transferable utility are a special 
class of cooperative games called sequencing games (for a thorough survey on sequencing 
games, see Curiel et al. [9]). While interesting per se, sequencing games address different 
situations, in which, in particular, an initial schedule exists, and utility transfers among the 
agents take into account the (more or less privileged) starting position of each agent. This 
case does not cover all situations, though. For instance, an agent may be willing to complete 
its jobs on time as much as possible, but the monetary loss for late jobs can be difficult to 
quantify.
A key point in multi-agent scheduling situations concerns how information circulates 
among the agents. In many circumstances, the individual agents do not wish to disclose the 
details of their own jobs (such as the processing times, or even their own objectives), either 
to the other agents, or to an external coordinator. In this case, in order to reach an allocation, 
some form of structured protocol has to be used, typically an auction mechanism. On the 
basis of their private information, the agents bid for the common resource. Auctions for 
scheduling problems are reviewed in Section 3, and two meaningful examples are described 
in some detail. A different situation is when the agents are prone to disclose information 
concerning their own jobs, to openly bargain for the resource. This situation is better 
captured by bargaining models (Section 4), in which the agents must reach an agreement over 
a bargaining set consisting of all or a number of relevant schedules. In this context, two 
distinct problems arise. First, the bargaining set has to be computed, possibly in an efficient 
way.
Second, within the bargaining set it may be of interest to single out schedules which are 
compatible with certain assumptions on the agents' rationality and behavior, as well as 
social welfare. The computation of these schedules can also be viewed as a tool for an 
external facilitator who wishes to drive the negotiation process towards a schedule 
satisfying given requirements of fairness and efficiency. These problems lead to a new, 
special class of multicriteria scheduling problems, which can be called multi-agent or 
competitive scheduling problems. Finally, in Section 5, we present some preliminary results 
which refer to structured protocols other than the auctions. In this case, the agents submit 
their jobs to an external coordinator, who selects the next job for processing. In all cases, we 
review known results and point out venues for future research. 
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3. Motivation and notation 
Multi-agent scheduling models arise in several applications.  Here we briefly review some 
examples.
x Brewer and Plott [7] address a timetable design problem in which a central rail 
administration sells to private companies the right to use railroad tracks during given 
timeslots. Private companies behave as decentralized agents with conflicting objectives 
that compete for the usage of the railroad tracks through a competitive ascending-price 
auction.   Each company has a set of trains to route through the network and a certain 
ideal timetable. Agent preferences are private values, but delayed timeslots have less 
value than ideal timeslots. 
Decentralized multi-agents scheduling models have been studied also for many other 
transportation problems, e.g., for aiport take-off and landing slot allocation problems 
[27]. For a comprehensive analysis of agent-based approaches to transport logistics, see 
[10].
x In [29, 4] the problem of integrating multimedia services for the standard SUMTS 
(Satellite-based Universal Mobile Telecommunication System) is considered.  In this 
case the problem is to assign radio resources to various types of packets, including 
voice, web browsing, file transfer via ftp etc.  Packet types correspond to agents, and 
have non-homogeneous objectives. For instance, the occasional loss of some voice-
packet can be tolerated, but the packets delay must not exceed a certain maximum 
value, not to compromise the quality of the conversation.  The transmission of a file via 
ftp requires that no packet is lost, while requirements on delays are soft. 
x Multi-agent scheduling problems have been widely analyzed in the manufacturing 
context [30, 21, 32].   In this case the elements of the production process (machines, jobs, 
workers, tools...) may act as agents, each having its own objective (typically related to 
productivity maximization). Agents can also be implemented to represent physical 
aggregations of resources (e.g., the shop floor) or to encapsulate manufacturing 
activities (e.g., the planning function). In this case, using the autonomous agents 
paradigm is often motivated by the fact that it is too complex and expensive to have a 
single, centralized decision maker. 
x Kubzin and Strusevich [16] address a maintenance planning problem in a two-machine 
shop. Here the maintenance periods are viewed as operations competing with the jobs 
for machines occupancy. An agent owns the jobs and aims to minimize the completion 
time of all jobs on all machines, while another agent owns the maintenance periods 
whose processing times are time dependent. 
We next introduce some notation, valid throughout the chapter. A set of m agents is given, 
each owning a set of jobs to be processed on a single machine. The machine can process only 
one job at a time. We let i denote an agent, i = 1,..., m,  its job set, and  the j-th of its 
jobs, having length . Let also . Depending on specific situations, there are 
other quantities associated to each job, such as a due date , a weight , which can be 
regarded as a measure of the job's importance (for agent i), a reward , which is obtained if 
the job is completed within its due date. We let denote a generic job, when agent's 
ownship is immaterial. Jobs are all available from the beginning and once started, jobs 
cannot be preeempted. A schedule is an assignment of starting times to the jobs. Hence, a 
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schedule is completely specified by the sequence in which the jobs are executed. Let be a 
schedule. We denote by  the completion time of job  in . If each agent owns 
exactly one job, we indicate the above quantities as .
Agent i has a utility function , which depends exclusively on the completion times of 
its own jobs. Function is nonincreasing as the completion times of its jobs grow. In 
some cases it will be more convenient to use a cost function , obviously nondecreasing 
for increasing completion times of the agent's jobs. 
Generally speaking, each agent aims at maximizing its own utility (or minimizing its costs). 
To pursue this goal, the agents have to make their decisions in an environment which is 
strongly characterized by the presence of the other agents, and will therefore have to carry 
out a suitable negotiation process. As a consequence, a decision support model must 
suitably represent the way in which the agents will interact to reach a mutually acceptable 
allocation. The next two chapters present in some detail two major modeling and procedural 
paradigms to address bargaining issues in a scheduling environment. 
4. Auctions for decentralized scheduling 
When dealing with decentralized scheduling methods, a key issue is how to reach a 
mutually acceptable allocation, complying with the fact that agents are not able (or willing) 
to exchange all the information they have. This has to do with the concept of private vs. 
public information. Agents are in general provided a certain amount of public information, 
but they will make their (bidding) decisions also on the basis of private information, which 
is not to be disclosed. Any method to reach a feasible schedule must therefore cope with the 
need of suitably representing and encoding public information, as well as other possible 
requirements, such as a reduced information exchange, and possibly yield "good" (from 
some individual and/or global viewpoint) allocations in reasonable computational time. 
Actually, several distributed scheduling approaches have been proposed, making use of some 
degree of negotiation and/or bidding among job-agents and resource-agents. Among the 
best known contributions, we cite here Lin and Solberg [21]. Pinedo [25] gives a concise 
overview of these methods, see also Sabuncuoglu and Toptal [28]. These approaches are 
typically designed to address dynamic, distributed scheduling problems in complex, large-
scale shop floor environments, for which a centralized computation of an overall "optimal" 
schedule may not be feasible due to communication and/or computation overhead. 
However, the conceptual framework is still that of a single subject (the system's owner) 
interested in driving the overall system performance towards a good result, disregarding 
jobs' ownship. In other words, in the context of distributed scheduling, market mechanisms 
are mainly a means to bypass technical and computational difficulties. Rather, we want to 
focus on formal models which explicitly address the fact that a limited number of agents, 
owning the jobs, bid for processing resources. In this respect, auction mechanisms display a 
number of positive features which make them natural candidates for complex, distributed 
allocation mechanisms, including scheduling situations. Auctions are usually simple to 
implement, and keep information exchange limited. The only information flow is in the 
format of bids (from the agents to the auctioneer) and prices (from the auctioneer to the 
agents). Also, the auction can be designed in a way that ensures certain properties of the 
final allocation. 
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Scheduling auctions regard the time as divided into time slots, which are the goods to be 
auctioned. The aim of the auction is to reach an allocation of time slots to the agents. This 
can be achieved by means of various, different auction mechanisms. Here we briefly review 
two examples of major auction types, namely an ascending auction and a combinatorial 
auction.
In this section we address the following situation. There is a set G of goods, consisting of T
time slots on the machine. Processing of a job requires an integer number of time slots 
on the machine, which can, in turn, process only one job at a time. If a job  is completed 
within slot , agent i obtains a reward . The agents bid for the time slots, and an 
auctioneer collects the bids and takes appropriate action to drive the bidding process 
towards a feasible (and hopefully, "good") allocation. We will suppose that each agent has a 
linear utility or value function (risk neutrality), which allows to compare the utility of 
different agents in monetary terms. The single-agent counterpart of the scheduling problem 
addressed here is the problem 1 .
What characterizes an auction mechanism is essentially how can the agents bid for the 
machine, and how the final allocation of time slots to the agents is reached. 
4.1 Prices and equilibria 
Wellman et al. [34] describe a scheduling economy in which the goods have prices, 
corresponding to amounts of money the agents have to spend to use such goods. An 
allocation is a partition of G into i subsets, X = {X1, X2,..., Xm}. Let vi (Xi) be the value function 
of agent i if it gets the subset of goods. The value of an allocation v (X) is the sum of 
all value functions, 
If slot t has price pt, the surplus for agent i is represented by 
Clearly, each agent would like to maximize its surplus, i.e. to obtain the set Xi* such that 
Now, if it happens that, for the current price vector p, each agent is assigned exactly the set 
Xi*, no agent has any interest in swapping or changing any of its goods with someone else's, 
and therefore the allocation is said to be in equilibrium for p1. An allocation 
                                                                
1 Actually, a more complete definition should include also the auctioneer, playing the role of the owner 
of the goods before they are auctioned. The value of good t to the auctioneer is qt, which is the starting 
price of each good, so that at the equilibrium pt = qt for the goods which are not being allocated. For the 
sake of simplicity, we will not focus on the auctioneer and implicitly assume that qt = 0 for all t.
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is optimal if its total value is maximum among all feasible 
allocations. 
Equilibrium (for some price vector p) and optimality are closely related concepts. In fact, the 
following property is well-known (for any exchange economy): 
Theorem 1: If an allocation X is in equilibrium at prices p, then it is optimal. 
In view of this (classical) result, one way to look at auctions is to analyze whether a certain 
auction mechanism may or may not lead to a price vector which supports equilibrium (and 
hence optimality). Actually, one may first question whether the converse of Theorem 1 
holds, i.e., an optimal allocation is in equilibrium for some price vector. Wellman et al. show 
that in the special case in which all jobs are unit-length ( = 1 for all , i = 1 , . . . , 
m) , an optimal allocation is supported by a price equilibrium (this is due to the fact that in 
this case each agent's preferences over time slots are additive, see Kelso and Crawford [15]). 
The rationale for this is quite simple. If jobs are unit-length, the different time slots are 
indeed independent goods in a market. No complementarities exist among goods, and the 
value of a good to an agent does not depend on whether the agent owns other goods. 
Instead, if one agent has one job of length pi = 2, obtaining a single slot is worthless to the 
agent if it does not get at least another. 
As a consequence, in the general case we cannot expect that any price formation mechanism 
reaches an equilibrium. Nonetheless, several auction mechanisms have been proposed and 
analyzed.
4.2 Interval scheduling 
Before describing the auction mechanisms, let us briefly introduce an optimization 
subproblem which arises in many auction mechanisms. 
Suppose that to use a certain time slot t, an agent i has to pay . Given the prices of the 
time slots, the problem is to select an appropriate subset of jobs from  and schedule them 
in order to maximize the agent i's revenue. Let ujt the utility (given the current prices) of 
starting job  at time t. Recalling that there is a reward for timely completion of job 
 (otherwise the agent may not have incentives to do any job), one has 
where  = 1 if x > 0 and  = 0 otherwise. Letting xjt = 1 if  is started in slot t, we
can formulate the problem as: 
(1)
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In any case, the need arises for combinatorial auction protocols, and in fact a number has 
appeared in the literature so far. These mechanisms have in common the fact that through 
an iterative information exchange between the agents and the auctioneer, a compromise 
schedule emerges. The amount and type of information exchanged characterizes the various 
auction protocols. Here we review one of these mechanisms, adapting it from Kutanoglu 
and Wu [17]2. The protocol works as follows. 
1. The auctioneer declares the prices of each time slot, let , t = 1,..., T indicate the price 
of time slot t. On this basis, each agent i prepares a bid Bi, i.e., indicates a set of (disjoint) 
time slot intervals that the agent is willing to purchase for the current prices.  Note that 
the bid is in the format of slot intervals, i.e.  Bi  = , meaning 
that it is worthless to the agent to get only a subset of each interval. 
2. The auctioneer collects all the bids. If it turns out that no slot is required by more than 
one agent, the set of all bids defines a feasible schedule and the procedure stops. Else, a 
feasible schedule is computed which is "as close as possible" to the infeasible schedule 
defined by the bids. 
3. The auctioneer modifies the prices of the time slots accounting for the level of conflict on 
each time slot, i.e., the number of agents that bid for that slot. The price modification 
scheme will tend to increase the price of the slots with a high level of conflict, while 
possibly decreasing the price of the slots which have not been required by anyone. 
4. The auctioneer checks a stopping criterion. If it is met, the best solution (from a global 
standpoint) so far is taken as final allocation.  Else, go back to step 1 and perform 
another round. 
Note that this protocol requires that a bid consists of a number of disjoint intervals, and each 
of them produces a certain utility if the agent obtains it. In other words, we assume that it is 
not possible for the agent to declare preferences such as "either interval [2,4] or [3,5]". This 
scheme leaves a number of issues to be decided, upon which the performance of the method 
may heavily depend. In particular: 
x How should each agent prepare its bid 
x How should the prices be updated 
x What stopping criterion should be used. 
4.4.1 Bid preparation 
The problem of the agent is again in the format of WJISP. Given the prices of the time slots, 
the problem is to select an appropriate subset of jobs from  and schedule them in order 
to maximize the agent i's revenue, with those prices. The schedule of the selected jobs 
defines the bid. 
We note here that in the context of this combinatorial auction mechanism, solving (1) exactly 
may not be critical. In fact, the bid information is only used to update the slot prices, i.e., to 
figure out which are the most conflicting slots. Hence, a reasonable heuristic seems the most 
appropriate approach to address the agent's problem (1) in this type of combinatorial 
auctions.
                                                                
2 Unlike the original model by Kutanoglu and Wu, we consider here a single machine, agents owning 
multiple jobs, and having as objective the weighted number of tardy jobs.
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4.4.2 Price update 
Once the auctioneer has collected all agents' bids, it can compute how many agents actually 
request each slot. At the r-th round of the auction, the level of conflict of slot t is simply 
the number of agents requesting that slot, minus 1 (note that  = — 1 if no agent is 
currently requesting slot t). A simple rule to generate the new prices is to set them linearly 
in the level of conflict: 
where kr is a step parameter which can vary during the algorithm. For instance, one can start 
with a higher value of kr, and decrease it later on (this is called adaptive tatonnement by
Kutanoglu and Wu). 
4.4.3 Stopping criterion and feasibility restoration 
This combinatorial auction mechanism may stop either when no conflicts are present in the 
union of all bids, or because a given number of iterations is reached. In the latter case, the 
auctioneer may be left with the problem of solving the residual resource conflicts when the 
auction process stops. This task can be easy if few conflicts still exist in the current solution. 
Hence, one technical issue is how to design the auction in a way that produces a good 
tradeoff between convergence speed and distance from feasibility. In this respect, and when 
the objective function is total tardiness, Kutanoglu and Wu [17] show that introducing price 
discrimination policies (i.e., the price of a slot may not be the same for all agents) may be of 
help, though the complexity of the agent subproblem may grow. As an example of a 
feasibility restoration heuristic, Jeong and Leon [18] (in the context of another type of 
auction-based scheduling system) propose to simply schedule all jobs in ascending order of 
their start times in the current infeasible schedule. Actually, when dealing with the multi-
agent version of problem l , it may well be the case that a solution without conflicts 
is produced, since many jobs are already discarded by the agents when solving WJISP. 
4.4.4 Relationship to Lagrangean relaxation 
The whole idea of a combinatorial auction approach for scheduling has a strong relationship 
with Lagrange optimization. In fact, the need for an auction arises because the agents are 
either unwilling or unable to communicate all the relevant information concerning their jobs 
to a centralized supervisor. Actually, what makes things complicated is the obvious fact that 
the machine is able to process one job at a time only. If there were no such constraint, each 
agent could decide its own schedule simply disregarding the presence of the other agents. 
So, the prices play the role of multipliers corresponding to the capacity constraints. 
To make things more precise, consider the problem of maximizing the overall total revenue. 
Since it is indeed a centralized problem, we can disregard agent's ownship. and simply use j
to index the jobs. We can use the classical time-indexed formulation by Pritsker et al. [26]3.
The variable xjt is equal to 1 if job j has started by time slot t and 0 otherwise. Hence, the 
revenue is won by the agent if and only if job j has started by time slot dj —pj + l.
                                                                
3 The following is a simplification of the development presented by Kutanoglu and Wu, who deal with 
job shop problems.
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(2)
Constraints (2) express machine capacity. In fact, for each t there can be at most one job j
which has already started at slot t and had not yet started at time t — pj (which means that j
is currently under process in slot t) . Now, if we relax the machine capacity constraints in a 
Lagrangean fashion, we get the problem 
(3)
(Note that (3) can be solved by inspection, separately for each job.) The value  is an 
upper bound on the optimal solution to (2). In an optimization context. one is typically 
interested in finding the best such bound, i.e.. 
(4)
To solve (5), a very common approach is to iteratively update the multiplier vector  by the 
subgradient algorithm, i.e., indicating by the current optimal solution to (3) when  = r
(5)
where sr is an appropriate step size. Now, observe that the term in braces in (5) is precisely 
what we previously called the level of conflict. Hence, it turns out that the subgradient 
algorithm is equivalent to a particular case of combinatorial auction (with adaptive 
tatonnement). 
5. Bargaining problems and Pareto optimal schedules 
We next want to analyze the scheduling problem from a different perspective. So far we 
supposed that it is possible, to a certain extent, to give a monetary evaluation of the quality 
of a solution. Actually, the value function of each agent might depend on certain schedule-
related quantities which may not be easy to assess. For instance, completing a job beyond its 
due date may lead to some monetary loss, but also to other consequences (e.g. loss of 
customers' goodwill) which can be difficult to quantify exactly. In such cases, it appears 
more sensible that the agents directly negotiate upon possible schedules. 
Bargaining models are a special class of cooperative games with non-transferable utility. For 
our scheduling situations, this means that the agents are, in principle, willing to disclose 
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information concerning their jobs, and use this information to build a set of solutions and 
reach a satisfactory compromise schedule. Note that, unlike our previous assumptions, the 
agents may now have heterogeneous objectives. Also, for the sake of simplicity we deal here 
with the situation in which there are only two agents. However, the major concepts can be 
cast in a more general, m-agent, setting. 
The viewpoint of axiomatic bargaining models is to characterize certain schedules, 
displaying some desirable properties which make them special candidates to be the outcome 
of negotiation. Here we want to apply some of these concepts to the scheduling setting, 
pointing out key issues from the modeling and computational viewpoints. 
5.1 Bargaining problems 
In a bargaining problem, two players (Agent 1 and Agent 2) have to negotiate a common 
strategy, i.e., choose an element of a set S of possible agreements. Each point s S is a pair of 
payoffs for Agent 1 and 2 respectively, denoted by u1(s) and u2(s). If negotiation fails, 
Agents 1 and 2 get the payoff d1 and d2 respectively. A bargaining problem is a pair (S, d), 
where:
1.
2. d = (d1, d2) is the disagreement point, i.e. the results of the failure of negotiation 
3. at least one point (u1, u2) S exists such that u1 > d1 and u2 > d2.
We next want to suitably characterize certain agreements in terms of efficiency and fairness. 
In fact, even if negotiation is helped by an external entity, it makes sense to select a few 
among all possible schedules, in order not to confuse the players with an excessive amount 
of information. A solution of a bargaining problem is an application which assigns to any 
problem instance (S, d) a subset of agreements (possibly, a single agreement)  (S, d) S. 
Consider now the following four axioms. which may or may not be satisfied by a certain 
solution :
1. (Weak) Efficiency (PAR): 
if s  (S, d), then there is no t S such that t1 > S1 and t2 > S2
2. Symmetry (SYM) : 
if (S, d) is symmetric, (u1, u2)  (S, d) if and only if  (u1, u2)  (S, d)
3. Scale Covariance (SC) : 
 such that , if we let 
:  and , then 
4. Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives (HA) : 
if we restrict the bargaining set to a subset such that , then 
.
The meaning of these axioms should be apparent. PAR means that if s  (S, d), then there 
is no other agreement such that both agents are better off, i.e., s is Pareto optimal. SYM 
implies that whenever the two agents have identical job sets and payoff functions, the 
outcome should give both players the same payoff. SC is related to the classical concept of 
utility, and states that the solution should not change if we use equivalent payoff 
representations. Finally, IIA says that the solution of a problem should not change if some 
agreements (not containing the solution) are removed from the bargaining set. 
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x How hard is it to generate extreme solutions in S?
x How large is the bargaining set S?
x How hard is it to compute the Nash bargaining solution? 
The answers to these questions strongly depend on the particular cost functions of the two 
agents. Though far from drawing a complete picture, a number of results in the literature 
exist, outlining a new class of scheduling problems. 
In view of (10), the problem of actually computing the set of Nash bargaining schedules is 
therefore a nonlinear optimization problem over a discrete set. In what follows, we study 
the computational complexity of generating the bargaining set S, for various cost functions 
c(·):
x (maximum of regular functions) , where each  is 
nondecreasing in Cj . 
x (number of tardy jobs) , where  = 1 if job Jj is late in  and 
 =  0 otherwise. 
x (total weighted flow time) .
We next analyze some of the scenarios obtained for various combinations of these cost 
functions.
5.3
This case contains all cases in which each agent aims at minimizing the maximum of non-
decreasing functions, each depending on the completion time of a job. Particular cases 
include makespan Cmax, maximum lateness Lmax, maximum tardiness Tmax and so on. 
The problem of finding an optimal solution to  be efficiently solved by an 
easy reduction to the standard well-known, single-agent problem , which can be 
solved, for example, with an O(n2) algorithm by Lawler [19]. Lawler 's algorithm for this 
special case may be sketched as follows. At each step, the algorithm selects, among 
unscheduled jobs, the job to be scheduled last. If we let be the sum of the processing 
times of the unscheduled jobs, then any unscheduled 2-job  such that can be 
scheduled to end at . If there is no such 2-job, we schedule the 1-job  for which  is 
minimum. If, at a certain point in the algorithm, all 1-jobs have been scheduled and no 2-job 
can be scheduled last, the instance is not feasible. (We observe that the above algorithm can 
be easily extended to the case in which precedence constraints exist among jobs, even across 
the job sets J1 and J2. This may be the case, for instance, of assembly jobs that require 
components machined and released by the other agent.) 
For each 2-job , let us define a deadline and
. The job set J2 can be ordered a priori, in non-decreasing order of 
deadlines ., in time O(n2 Iog n2). At each step the only 2-job that needs to be considered is 
the unscheduled one with largest . On the other hand, for each job in J1, the 
corresponding value must be computed. Supposing that each  value can be 
computed in constant time, whenever no 2-job can be scheduled. all unscheduled 1-jobs may 
have to be tried out. Since this happens n1 times, we may conclude with the following 
Theorem 4: Problem can be solved in time .
Using the above algorithm, we get an optimal solution * to . Let 
. In general, we are not guaranteed that * is Pareto 
optimal. However, to find an optimal solution which is also Pareto optimal, we only need to 
Combinatorial Models for Multi-agent Scheduling Problems 35
exchange the roles of the two agents, and solve an instance of  in which *
is the optimal value of  obtained with the Lawler's algorithm. Since this computation 
will require time , we may state the following 
Theorem 5: A Pareto optimal solution to Problem  can be computed in time 
.
The set of all Pareto optimal solutions (i.e., the bargaining set S) can be found by the 
algorithm in Fig.l in which the quantity must be small enough in order not to miss any 
other Pareto-optimal solution. The to be used depends on the actual shape of the f
functions. If their slope is small, small values of may be needed. Finally, in [1] it is shown 
that the following result holds. 
Theorem 6: There are at most n1n2 Pareto optimal schedules in .
As a consequence, and recalling Proposition 1, the problem  can be 
solved in time for any value of  [0, 1]. Similarly, from Theorem 6, 
finding the Nash bargaining solution simply requires to compute values u1( )u2( ) in 
equation (10) for all possible pairs of Pareto optimal solutions, which can be done in time 
.
5.4
This case contains all cases in which Agent 1 aims at minimizing the completion time of its 
jobs, while Agent 2 wants to minimize the maximum of nondecreasing functions, each 
depending on the completion time of the jobs in J2.
5.4.1
In this section we show that is polynomially solvable. Two lemmas 
allow us to devise the solution algorithm for this problem. 
Lemma 1: Consider a feasible instance of  and let . If there is a 
2-job such that , then there is an optimal schedule in which is scheduled last, and 
there is no optimal schedule in which a 1-job is scheduled last.
Proof. Let ' be an optimal schedule in which J| is not scheduled last, and let * be the 
schedule obtained by moving  in the last position. For any job other than ,
 and therefore, . In particular, if a 1-job is last 
in ', then , thus contradicting the optimality of '. For what 
concerns , its completion time is now , and by hypothesis . Hence, due to 
the regularity of for all k, the schedule * is still feasible and optimal.  
The second lemma specifies the order in which the 1-jobs must be scheduled. 
Lemma 2: Consider a feasible instance of  and let . If for all 1-
jobs , , then in any optimal schedule a longest l-job is scheduled last.
Proof. The result is established by a simple interchange argument.  
The solution algorithm is similar to the one in Section 5.3. At each step, the algorithm selects 
a job to be scheduled last among unscheduled jobs. If possible, a 2-job is selected. Else, the 
longest l-job is scheduled last. If all 1-jobs have been scheduled and no 2-job can be 
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optimal solution for the single agent problem can be computed with the 
Smith's rule, i.e., ranking the jobs by nondecreasing values of the ratios  . The question 
then arises of whether 1-jobs are processed in this order also in the Pareto optimal solutions 
of . Unfortunately, it is easy to show that this is not the case in general. 
Consider the following example. 
Example 1: Suppose that set J2 consists of a single job having processing time  = 10, and that 
, i.e., that Agent 2 is only interested in competing his/her job within time  = 20. 
Agent 1 owns four jobs  with processing times and weights shown in table 1. 
Sequencing the 1-jobs with the Smith's rule and then inserting the only 2-job in the latest feasible 
position, one obtains the sequence , with  = 9*6+7*21+4*24+5* 28 = 
437, while the optimal solution is , with  = 9*6+5*10+7*25+4*28= 
391.
Table 1. Data for Agent 1 in Example 1 
We note that in the optimal solution of Example 1, Consecutive jobs of Agent 1 are WSPT-
ordered. Yet it is not trivial to decide how to insert the 2-jobs in the schedule. Indeed even 
when there is only one job of Agent 2 and its objective is to minimize , the 
problem turns out to be binary NP-hard. The reduction uses the well-known NP-hard 
KNAPSACK problem.
KNAPSACK. Given two sets of nonnegative integers {u1, u2, ···, un} and {w1, w2, ···, wn}, and
two integers b and W, find a subset S  {1,... ,n} such that and is
maximum. 
Theorem 10: is binary NP-hard.
Proof. We give a sketch of the proof, details can be found in [1]. Given an instance of 
KNAPSACK, we define an instance of as follows. Agent 1 has n jobs,
having processing times and weights , i = 1,..., n. Agent 2 has only one 
very long job, having processing time B. Also, we set the deadline for the 2-job to b+B. Now, 
the completion times of all the 1-jobs ending after the 2-job will pay B. If B is very large, the 
best thing one can do is therefore to maximize the total weight of the 1-jobs scheduled before 
the 2-job. Since these 1-jobs have to be scheduled in the interval [0,b], this is precisely 
equivalent to solving the original instance of KNAPSACK.
5.5.2 Generating extreme solutions 
Interestingly, while is NP-hard, the corresponding Problem 
 can be solved in polynomial time, as observed by Smith and 
Baker [5]. First note that, in any Pareto optimal solution, with no loss of generality Agent 2 
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5.6 Other scenarios 
In the cases considered above, we observed that when problem  is poly-
nomially solvable, the number of Pareto optimal solutions is polynomially bounded, 
whereas if the same problem is NP-hard there are exponentially (pseudo-polynomially) 
many Pareto optima. Nonetheless, no general relationship links these two aspects. As an 
example, consider Problem which is NP-hard (this is a trivial 
consequence of Theorem 10). Clearly, the number of Pareto optimal solutions of any 
problem of the class cannot exceed n2, for any possible choice of Agent 1 
objective. 
Table 2 summarizes the complexity results of several two-agent scheduling problems. In 
particular, note that the complexity of is not known yet. In [24] it is 
shown that  is NP-hard under high multiplicity encoding (see also [6]), 
which does not rule out the possibility of a polynomial algorithm for the general case. If this 
problem were polynomially solvable, this would imply that is in 
P.
In [3], some extensions of the results reported in Table 2 to the case of k agents are 
addressed. When multiple agents want to minimize fmax objective functions, a simple 
separability procedure enables to solve an equivalent problem instance with a reduced 
number of agents. In Table 3 we report the complexity results for some maximal 
polinomially solvable cases. 
*The problem is NP-Hard under high multiplicity encoding [24] 
Table 2. Summary of complexity results for decision and Pareto optimization problems for 
two-agent scheduling problems 
Table 3. Maximal polynomially solvable cases of multi-agent scheduling problems 
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6. Single resource scheduling with an arbitrator 
In this section we briefly describe a different decentralized scheduling architecture, making 
use of a special coordination protocol. A preliminary version of the results presented here 
are reported in [2]. The framework considered is the same described in Section 5.2. Again, 
we consider a single machine (deterministic, non-preemptive) scheduling setting with two 
agents, owning job sets J1 =  and J2 =  respectively. Each agent 
wants to optimize its own cost function. 
In this scenario, the agents are not willing to disclose complete information concerning their 
jobs to the other agent, but only to an external coordination subject, called arbitrator. The 
protocol consists of iteratively performing the following steps: 
1. Each agent submits one job to the arbitrator for possible processing. 
2. The arbitrator selects one of the submitted jobs, according to a priority rule , and 
schedules it at the end of the current schedule. We assume the current schedule is 
initially empty. 
The priority rule is public information, whereas jobs characteristics are private information 
of the respective agent. The information disclosed by the agent concerns the processing time 
and/or other quantities relevant to apply the priority rule. After the job is selected and 
scheduled, its processing time is communicated also to the other agent. 
Let , be the cost function Agent h, h = 1,2, wants to minimize. We 
next report some results concerning the following cases for :
1. total completion time ;
2. total weighted completion time ; and 
3. number of late jobs .
As for the arbitrator rules , we consider 
1. Priority rules SPT, WSPT, and EDD if the arbitrator selects the next job to be scheduled 
between the two candidates according their minimum processing time, weighted 
processing time, and due date, respectively. 
2. Round-Robin rule RR: if agents' jobs are alternated. 
3. k- : a hybrid rule where at most k consecutive jobs of the same agents are selected 
according to rule .
In the following, we indicate the problem where the agents want to minimize cost functions 
 and the arbitrator rule is , as .
Example 2: Consider the two job sets in Table 4- Suppose the arbitrator has a rule R = EDD. Then, 
it will choose the earliest due date job between the two candidates. If the job is late in the sequence it is 
cancelled from the schedule. The resulting sequence is illustrated in Table 5.
Table 4. Job sets of Example 2 
On this basis, one is interested in investigating several scenarios, for different objective 
functions f1, f 2 and arbitrator rules . In particular, it is of interest to analyze the deviation 
of the resulting sequence from some "social welfare" solution (whatever the definition of 
such solution is). Of course, in an unconstrained scenario, one agent, say Agent 1, could 
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improve its objective function penalizing the objective of Agent 2 and the global 
performance. This would obviously occur if Agent 1 were free to decide the schedule of its 
jobs. As a consequence, one may ask if arbitrator's rules exist that make a fair behavior 
convenient for both agents. 
In the remainder of this section, we are addressing the latter problem in different scenarios, 
assuming as a social welfare solution one which minimizes the (unweighted) sum of the cost 
functions of the two agents. 
Definition 1: Given objective functions for the two agents, a global optimum is a 
sequence of minimizing the sum of the two objectives fl + f2.
Definition 2: Given objective functions for the two agents, and the priority rule 
R, an R -optimum is a sequence of minimizing the sum of the two objectives fl + f2,
among all the sequences which can be obtained applying rule R.
Table 5. Resulting sequence of Example 2 
Definition 3: Given the objective function  of Agent h (h = 1,2), and the priority rule , a h-
optimum is a sequence of jobs in that minimizes fh, among all the sequences which can be 
obtained applying rule .
6.1 WSPT rule 
We start our analysis with , that is the problem where both 
agents want to minimize their total (weighted) completion times and the arbitrator selects 
the next job choosing the one with the smallest processing time over weight ratio. Hereafter 
this ratio is referred to as density . For a job i, with processing time pi and positive weight 
wi , . In classical single machine scheduling, a sequence of jobs in non-decreasing 
order of density (WSPT-order) minimizes . By standard pairwise interchange 
arguments, it is easy to prove the following: 
Proposition 4: In the scenario , if both agents propose WSPT-
ordered candidate jobs, the resulting sequence is 1- optimal, 2-optimal, R -optimal and globally 
optimal. 
Figure 2. Schedule is a Nash Equilibrium 
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Note that if we view the scenario as a game in which each 
agent's strategy is the order in which the jobs are submitted, Proposition 4 can be 
equivalently stated saying that the pair of strategies consisting in ordering the jobs in WSPT 
is the only Nash equilibrium. 
6.2 Round Robin rules 
We call round-robin schedule a schedule where the jobs of the two agents are alternating. In 
this section, we deal with the problems arising when the arbitrator selects the candidate jobs 
according to a rule  = RR, i.e., the only feasible schedules are round-robin schedules. Note 
that this embodies a very simple notion of fairness: the agents take turns in using the 
resource. 
For simplicity, in the following we assume an equal number of jobs n1 = n2 = n for the two 
agents. With no loss of generality, we also suppose that each agent's jobs are numbered by 
nondecreasing length, , for all i = 1,..., n—1 and h = 1,2.
6.2.1
When the agents want to minimize their total completion times among all possible round-
robin rules, their strategy simply consists in presenting their jobs in SPT-order. Again by 
standard pairwise interchange arguments, one can show that the following propositions 
holds. 
Proposition 5: In the scenario , if both agents propose SPT-ordered 
candidate jobs, the resulting sequence is 1-optimal, 2-optimal and RR-optimal.
Let be the RR-optimal schedule. Since it may not be globally optimal, we want to 
investigate the competitive ratio of , i.e., the largest possible ratio between the cost of the 
RR-optimal schedule and the optimal value for an unconstrained schedule of the same 
jobs.
Let us denote with 
x OPTSPT the cost of a global optimum of 
x cSPT (A) the cost of an optimal solution of 
cSPT (B) the cost of an optimal solution of 
x OPTRR: the total cost of .
The following proposition holds. 
Proposition 6: OPTRR 2OPTSPT
Proof sketch. It suffices to note that OPTRR 2cSPT(A) + 2cSPT(B) 2OPTSPT.
Figure 3. Istance with O(n) competitive ratio. The case with n - k - 1 < k is depicted 
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6.2.2
Hereafter, we consider a generalization of the round-robin rule. The arbitrator selects one 
between the two candidate jobs according rule R, but no more than k consecutive jobs 
of the same agent are allowed in the final sequence. We call k round-robin (briefly, k-RR) a
schedule produced by the above rule. (Note that for k = 1 we reobtain round-robin 
schedules.) 
Let us denote by a k-R -optimal schedule. One may show very easily that 
Proposition 7: In the scenario ; if both agents propose SPT-ordered 
candidate jobs, the resulting sequence is 1- optimal, 2- optimal and k — RR -optimal.
k-R
However, unlike the round-robin case, the competitive ratio 
for general values of k may be arbitrarily bad. The example illustrated in Figure 3, for 
sufficiently large values of M and small enough positive , has a O(n) ratio. 
6.3  EDD rules 
We conclude this section with an example in which  = EDD, i.e., the arbitrator schedules 
the most urgent between the two submitted. It is interesting to note as this rule may produce 
arbitrarily bad sequences in scenario .
Consider the instance of reported in Table 6, where n >> m >> 1.
Figure 4 illustrates a global optimum. Note that there are m + 1 tardy jobs for Agent 1 and 0 
for Agent 2. 
Table 6. An instance of 
A 1-optimal schedule is obtained if Agent 1 just skips A1 in the list of candidate jobs, and 
submits all the others, from 2 to m + 3. The resulting schedule is illustrated in Figure 5: in 
this case there are n + m + 1 tardy jobs and just one job of Agent 1 is tardy. Hence, again the 
competitive ratio is O(n). In such situations, the coordination rule turns out to be ineffective 
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and a preliminary negotiation between the two agents seems a much more recommendable 
strategy to obtain agreeable solutions for the two agents. 
Figure 4. Globally optimal schedule for the instance of Table 6 
Figure 5. 1-optimal schedule for the instance of Table 6 
7. Conclusions 
In this chapter we have described a number of models which are useful when several agents 
have to negotiate processing resources on the basis of their scheduling performance. 
Research in this area appears at a fairly initial stage. Among the topics for future research 
we can mention: 
x An experimental comparison of different auction mechanisms for scheduling problems, 
in terms of possibly addressing general systems (shops, parallel machines...) 
x Analyzing several optimization problems, related to finding "good" overall solutions to 
multi-agent scheduling problems 
x Designing and analyzing effective scheduling protocols and the corresponding agents' 
strategies. 
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